Rule By Purge

"History suggests that Pyongyang's recent execution of elite officials over last year's bungled currency reform herald the start of another bloody purge, with dire signs of famine adding to its likely intensity," says Yong Kwon — Pyongyang purge echoes Stalin. This is, of course, nothing new:

Kim Jong-il may have pushed his luck too often. In October 1992, even before his father Kim Il-sung's death, the Dear Leader executed 20 officers with Soviet training and dismissed 300 when it was revealed that they criticized "the system". Analysts say that this was a ploy by Kim Jong-il to take control of the military, which at the time was dominated by Soviet-trained officers, to secure his position in the line of succession.

In April 1995, after the death of Kim Il-sung, the Dear Leader consolidated his military and political authority by executing those accused of plotting a coup and embezzling funds used for foreign exchange. Popular narratives estimated several hundred army officers were executed. The man in charge of the 1995 purge, Kim Yong-chun, is currently chief of the general staff of the North Korean People's Army.

The most repressive purge ran parallel to the most dire moment in Kim Jong-il's regime, the 1995-98 famine. While millions starved to death in the "Arduous March", the regime accused agricultural secretary Seo Gwan-hee of being an American spy and summarily disposed of him.

Along with the agricultural secretary, 2,000 others (along with their families) were purged for crimes of espionage dating to the Korean War in the early 1950s. In the aftermath of this purge, and recognizing the extensive damage to party loyalty caused by excessive killings, Kim Jong-il eliminated those who were responsible for the purge by accusing them of "alienating the party from the people for the selfish pursuit of power".

It was a grim parody of Stalin's own purges, which in the end claimed the lives of those who were the most adamant supporters of the murders (Genrikh Yagoda and Nikolai Yezhov).